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ABSTRACT
This paper conducts a Cox-type survival analysis of Japanese corporate firms using census-coverage
data collected by METI. A study of exiting firms confirmed several characteristics of Japanese firms
in the 1990s. First, excessive internalization in the corporate structure and activities is harmful to
corporate survival. Having too many establishments and affiliates weakens corporate performance.
Efficient concentration on core competences increases the probability of survival. Second, global
commitment helps Japanese firms be more competitive and more likely to survive. However, the
channels of a firm's global commitment must be carefully selected. Small firms can benefit from
exporting activities, though having foreign affiliates or conducting foreign outsourcing might
aggravate their performance. Large firms, on the other hand, can conduct foreign direct investment
and foreign outsourcing to possibly enhance the probability of their survival. Third, while corporate
performance affects the choice of exits for affiliate firms, it does not affect the survival/exit of
independent firms; suggesting the possible malfunctioning of the market mechanisms in the exits
of independent firms. Fourth, we do not find any statistically significant evidence that firms with
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1. Introduction
For  the  Japanese  economy,  the  1990s  have  been  called  a  lost  decade.
Following a series of intensive debates among economists, we now share the view that
issues are not simply cyclical, determined by the business cycle, but are related to the
existence of serious structural problems that have driven the long-term recession.    The
financial sector and macroeconomic management have obviously had severe problems.
Japanese companies, once were praised as the core of the “Japanese economic system,”
also seem to suffer from structural impediments that prevented them from adjusting to
the new economic environment that arrived in the 1990s.
Recent  academic  and  other  literature  has  reached  a  consensus  that  three
generalizations can be made about Japanese corporate firms in the 1990s.    First, in the
late 1980s, Japanese firms excessively expanded their boundaries and internalized.
1    To
take advantage of the economies of scope and risk pooling, many firms entered new
fields and diversified their products.    In the course of diversification, they founded a
number  of  establishments  and  affiliates  in  both  domestic  and  foreign  locations  to
facilitate new enterprises.    Furthermore, firms were active in developing tight intra-
firm-group  networks  and  long-term  inter-firm  relationships.    The  wide  scope  of
internalized  activities  within  a  firm  as  well  as  extended  intra-firm-group/inter-firm
relationships was  regarded as an essential  component of long-term efficiency  in the
context of the so-called Japanese economic system.
However, once  the  Japanese economy  slumped,  as  well  as having  to face
foreign competition in the 1990s, a drastic reversal began.    The excessive expansion of
corporate  activities  and  inter-firm  relationships  suddenly  became  a  source  of
inefficiency;  Japanese  firms  were  forced  to  reduce  the  scope  of  their  activities,  to
reorganize their establishments and affiliates, and to critically review their old inter-firm
relationships.    The old type of corporate structure and inter-firm relationships seemed
                                                   
1 In this paper, the word “internalization” represents a fairly wide concept.    It does not
simply mean the ratio of internalized value added out of total sales values.    More
fundamentally, it consists of various “activities” internalized within the boundary of a
firm.    It is not easy to capture the actual contents of internalized activities, but we can
indirectly observe the degree of internalization through corporate structure such as the4
to work against corporate performance during this period.
Second, excessive adaptation to the period of rapid economic growth resulted
in a rigid industrial structure and low turnover ratios of firms.    Cross-shareholding, the
subcontracting system, and other types of long-term inter-firm relationships made the
cost of firms’ exits extraordinary high.    Cooperative labor relations as well as various
government regulations also became an obstacle to efficient turnovers.    A very limited
number  of  mergers  and  acquisitions  (M&As)  were  apparent;  with  very  few  firms
experiencing  hostile  takeovers.
2    Scarcity  of  turnovers  obviously  delayed  necessary
adjustments to the industrial structure and helped prolong the poor economic situation.
Third,  even  in  such  a  stagnant  situation,  the  global  commitment  of  firms
worked as a crucial element for enhancing efficiency.
3    Good firms tended to develop
external activities.    At the same time, in the opposite direction of causality, various
types of global commitment such as exporting activities, foreign direct investment, and
foreign  outsourcing  seemed  to  improve  corporate  performance  by  accelerating  the
efficient reformulation of corporate structure and inter-firm relationships.
These  generalizations  have  not  been  fully  proved  by  formal  economic
analysis.    In particular, in the absence of census-coverage statistics providing longer-
term stable data, no serious empirical study of the survival and exit of firms has hitherto
been  done  for  the  Japanese  economy.
4    However,  with  the  presentation  of  METI’s
firm-level  survey,  taken  in  a  series  of  fixed  times,  we  can  now  conduct  formal
                                                                                                                                                        
number of establishments and affiliates in addition to using outsourcing contracts.
2 Shimizu (2001, p. 88) reports that listed companies on the Tokyo Stock Exchange that
have conducted mergers account for only 71 out of all listed companies during the
period 1949-1998 (1273 in his sample).    The Fair Trade Commission (FTC),
Government of Japan (2002, p. 220) has shown that the number of mergers reported to
FTC was only 151, 170, and 127 in 1999 F/Y, 2000 F/Y, and 2001 F/Y, respectively.
3 The concept of “global commitment” is taken from Lewis and Richardson (2001), who
include various channels of firms’ engagement with external links such as exports,
imports, inward and outward investment, technology transfer, and so on.    Lewis and
Richardson present various kinds of empirical evidence and also provide a literature
survey.    They claim “globally engaged Americans seem economically healthier – more
productive, more stable, and materially better off – than other Americans (p. 13).”
4 Honjo (2000) conducted survival analysis for the manufacturing firms located in
Tokyo with using the data bank of Tokyo Shoko Research (TSR).    Shimizu (2001)
analyzed the corporate survival in terms of the listing at Tokyo Stock Exchange.
However, their data sets are much smaller than census-coverage statistics.5
survival/exit analyses.
Because M&As are rare in Japan, we can primarily interpret the exit of a firm
as  an  indication  of  its  poor  performance.    If  this  is  the  case,  we  want  to  confirm
whether over-internalization of the corporate structure makes a firm prone to exit, and
whether global commitment helps a firm survive.    In addition, if the cost of exiting
matters in the turnover of firms in Japan, we may find differences between the cases of
affiliates  of  other  firms  and  those  of  independent  firms  when  we  investigate  the
relationship between corporate performance and the probability of survival/exit.    This
paper focuses on the characteristics specific to Japanese firms in terms of corporate
structure, inter-firm relationships, and globalizing activities; and examines how these
factors affect the survival of firms.    The empirical study is based on a survival analysis
using Cox’s proportional hazard model with panel data for Japanese firms for the period
between 1994 F/Y and 1999 F/Y.
Cox’s  proportional  hazard  model  was  originally  developed  in  the  field  of
biology and medical science to analyze the survival in living animals, and was first
applied in economics for survival analysis of corporate firms and establishments in the
mid 1990s.    The first application of Cox’s model was the survival analysis of U.S.
firms  and  establishments.    The  seminal  works  were  by  Audretsch  (1995)  and
Audretsch  and  Mahmood  (1994,  1995),  followed  by  Agarwal  (1998),  Klepper  and
Simons  (2000),  Agarwal  and  Audretsch  (2001)  and  others.    Similar  studies  were
conducted in Europe.    Mata and Portugal (1994) and Mata, Portugal and Guimaraes
(1995)  on  Portuguese  firms  were  in the  first cohort,  and  a  number of studies were
subsequently conducted using the data of countries such as Germany (Harhoff, Stahl
and Woywode, 1998), Italy (Audretsch, Santerelli and Vivarelli, 1999), and Norway
(Tveteras  and  Eide,  2000).    These  studies  primarily  found  that  the  size  and
technological level of a firm seemed to positively affect its survival.    However, the
relationship  of  corporate  structure  (including  establishments  and  affiliates)  with
survival/exit has not yet fully been explored.    Further, few studies have analyzed the
connection between the global commitment of firms and their survival.
5    In this regard,
                                                   
5 Li (1995) and McCloughan and Stone (1998) analyze the exit of foreign affiliates from
the viewpoint of host country.    However, their studies do not directly examine the6
our study has a unique focus.
The plan of the paper is as follows: the next section explains the statistical
data  used, section 3  presents our analytical  methodology,  section 4  summarizes our
hypotheses,  and  section  5  reports  our  analytical  results.    The  last  section  offers  a
conclusion.
2. Data
Our data set is constructed from the firm-level micro data of Kigyo Katsudo
Kihon Chosa (Basic Survey of Business Structure and Activity).    This survey was first
conducted in 1992 F/Y, then in 1995 F/Y, and annually thereafter.    The prime purpose
of the survey is to capture the overall structure of Japanese corporate firms in terms of
their diversification, internationalization, inter-firm linkages, and strategies on R&D and
information  technology.    Financial  information,  however,  is  minimal.    The  survey
covers all firms that have more than 50 workers, have a capital of more than 30 million
yen, and an establishment that is engaged in mining, manufacturing, the wholesale/retail
trade, or the restaurant business.    Domestic and foreign affiliates are defined as the
ones held by Japanese domestic firms for more-than-50% shares.    We constructed a
longitudinal data set by connecting annual firm-level data from 1994 F/Y to 1999 F/Y.
The Basic Survey has several attractive features.    First, it provides firm-level
data.    Most of the world’s firm-related statistics are given on an establishment basis,
rather than on a firm basis, and thus most of the related empirical studies in the United
States, Canada, and other countries have used establishment-level longitudinal data.    In
the case of Japan, too, establishment-level microdata are available in the form of the
Kogyo Tokei Hyo (Census of Manufactures).    Establishment-level data are useful for
analyzing production activities but are not entirely appropriate for examining corporate
activities as a whole.    A corporate firm is an individual economic entity that makes
economic  decisions.    When  we  wish  to investigate the  structure,  performance,  and
strategies of corporate firms, firm-level data have clear advantages.
                                                                                                                                                        
global commitment of firms.7
The second strength of the Basic Survey is its frequency.    Censuses tend to
be conducted only once in several years because of the huge amount of cost and labor
required in processing the statistics.
6    However, in order to precisely identify the nature
of entry and exit of corporate firms, data are needed at more frequent intervals.    The
Basic Survey collects annual data, which provide far richer information on the survival
of firms.
Third,  relatively  high ratios  of  effective  questionnaire  returns are  also  the
strength of the Basic Survey.    Statistics conducted by the Government of Japan are
legally classified into two categories: designated statistics (shitei tokei) and approved
statistics (shonin tokei).    The Basic Survey belongs to the first type, firms in the survey
being  required  to  complete  and  return  the  questionnaires  under  the  Statistics  Law.
7
The actual ratios of effective questionnaire returns are not disclosed but are probably
between 90% and 95%.    More importantly, the firm list itself is widely recognized as
being precise.    Hence, we can be confident that the distortion due to a low effective
return rate is relatively small.
Even with a data set of such quality, great care is needed in defining the exit
of firms.    In particular, because the turnover ratios of Japanese firms are known to be
very low, data handling could be a fairly delicate matter.    A weak point of the Basic
Survey in the context of survival analysis is that it does not include a reconfirmation
process to check whether a firm genuinely exits from the market or not.    Therefore, to
identify  whether  a  firm  exits  from  the  market  or  not  must  depend  solely  on  the
information on whether or not the company concerned shows up in the data set.
In general, there are various reasons why a firm can be omitted from the data
set.    Omissions  can  occur,  for  example,  when  a  firm  happens  not  to  return  the
questionnaire, or when a firm geographically relocates headquarters, or when a firm
switches the industry it belongs to, or when mergers and acquisitions (M&As) occur.
The permanent firm numbering system in the Basic Survey deals with most of industry
                                                   
6 For example, the seminal paper of the literature, Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson
(1989), uses the U.S. manufacturing censuses that are conducted once in five years.
7Collection of “Approved” statistics is not backed by strong legal enforcement so that
effective return ratios tend to be low.8
switching and geographical relocation.
8    However, for example, when a firm changes
the nature of its activities and loses establishments covered by the survey, the firm drops
out of the data set.    Furthermore, some firms may leave the sample set because of
shrinkage in size; the Basic Survey has a cut-off line in size as mentioned above.
To  keep  erroneous  interpretation  to  a  minimum,  this  paper  treats  firms
dropping from  the survey in two  sequent years as those that get out of the market.
Because data from 1994 F/Y to 1999 F/Y are available, so that we can identify whether
the firms survive or not, our data set consists of corporate firms that were in business in
1994  F/Y, 1995  F/Y, 1996  F/Y, and/or 1997  F/Y.    In addition,  and  considering  the
possibility of relatively small firms dropping from the data set due to shrinkage in their
size,  we  conduct  regressions  with  the  sample  set  of  firms  employing  100  or  more
workers, a matter that is discussed in detail in the Appendix.
3. Methodology: the proportional hazard model
This section presents the  proportional  hazard  model that we  utilize in our
survival analysis of corporate firms.
The  analysis  of  survival  and  exit  of  corporate  firms  requires  careful
consideration  of  methodology.    If  we  collect  data  only  for  firms  exiting  from  the
market and  conduct OLS regressions, serious sampling bias occurs.    Although it is
possible to treat survival and exit as discrete choices and conduct logit or probit analysis,
we cannot take into account changes over time with respect to each firm.    To overcome
these problems, we would have to observe all firms from entry to exit, which is virtually
impossible in most studies.    The sample period typically ends before most of the firms
get out of the market.    This is a serious censored data problem that we must confront.
The issue is how to utilize the information on firms that survive.    One way is
to conduct event history analysis using a model such as the proportional hazard model.
Event history analysis  examines what  happens over  a  time span before  some event
                                                   
8 Kimura and Kiyota (2003) find that a substantial number of firms covered by the Basic
Survey switch industries over time.    This suggests that the survey follows industry9
occurs; in our case, “some event” is the exit of a firm.    It specifies the survival function
that describes the probability of a firm’s survival until a certain time has elapsed.    By
using  a  hazard  function,  the  probability  of a  firm’s  exit  at  a  certain  time  period is
expressed.
The survival function is specified as follows:
† 
S(t)= Pr(T ≥ t), 	

where T is the duration of survival of a firm and t is a certain time point.    The function
presents the probability of a firm’s survival at time t as a function of t.    The hazard
function  describes  the  probability  of  the  risk  of  some  event  occurring.    When  we
denote the probability density function of event occurrence as 
† 
f(t), the hazard function
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where  T  is  the  duration  of  a  firm  and  t  denotes  time.    This  function  presents  the
probability  that the  event  (exit)  occurs  in  a  fraction  of time  ϶t,  conditional on  no
occurrence of the event until time t (i.e. the firm survives until time t).    However, it is
empirically difficult to specify the functional form of the hazard function in our case
due to problems such as that of specifying probability distribution.
9
The extended version of the proportional hazard model (Cox (1972, 1975))
analyzes  the  relationship  between  the  probability  of  event  occurrence  and  various
covariates,  based  on  the  concept  of  hazard  function.    It  imposes  the  condition  of
“hazard  proportionality”  and  makes  the  analysis  of  covariates  possible  without
specifying a hazard function itself.    “Hazard proportionality” is the assumption that the
proportion  of  two  kinds  of  hazard  is  constant  over  time.    The  model  treats  each
sample’s hazard rate 
† 
hi(t) as a function of a number of covariates.    It conceptually
                                                                                                                                                        
switching pretty well.
9 In the case of durable time analysis of machines, for example, we can specify the
survival function or hazard function because we a priori know the distribution of
durable time as the Weibull distribution.    However this is not the case when we10
defines the baseline hazard (
† 
h0(t)) that is not influenced by any covariate and treats the
proportion  of 
† 
hi(t)  and 
† 
h0(t)  as  constant  based  on  the  hazard  proportionality
assumption.    Hence, the proportion is interpreted as a function of covariates.





hi(t) = h0(t)exp(bxi) . (5)
This is the proportional hazard model.    By taking logarithm, we obtain
† 
loghi(t)= logh0(t)+ bxi . (6)
In this model, we investigate the factors that explain the height of hazard rates.
Thus,  a  negative  coefficient  means  that  the  explanatory  variable  is  associated  with
higher survival probability, while a positive coefficient suggests that the explanatory
variable accelerate the exit of firms.
Even though the baseline hazard, 
† 
h0(t), is not obtained ex ante because the
distribution of the hazard is unknown, it can be estimated ex post.
10    Figure 1 presents
the baseline survival function S0(t) calculated from the estimated baseline hazard h0(t).
11
This function indicates the survival pattern of sample firms when any covariates do not
affect the survival of firms, which is specified as
† 
S0(t) = exp{-H 0(t)}, (7)
where  H0(t)  is  the  cumulative  function  of  baseline  hazard,  h0(t).    This  curvature
suggests that the probability of exit is higher in an early period before covariates are
taken into account.    The deviation of actual hazard from the baseline hazard (h0(t)) is
                                                                                                                                                        
conduct survival analysis of corporate firms.
10 To estimate parameter  Ќ, we use the partial likelihood estimation method.    When
we denote the set of firms that have not experienced the event (exit) at time t as R(t),
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’ .    Then, we do not have to specify the
baseline hazard function, 
† 
h0(t).    For further explanation, please refer to Cox (1972,
1975), Kiefer (1988), or Kalbfleisch and Prentice (2002).




4. Explaining the probability of exits
For various reasons the exit of a firm can take different forms.    For example,
M&As are a typical form of a firm’s exit, where poor corporate performance is not
necessarily the trigger.
13    However, in Japan during the 1990s, hostile takeovers were
quite rare; and  thus  the  exit of a  firm can  largely  be interpreted as a  result of bad
performance.    In what follows, we discuss the expected sign of the coefficient for each
explanatory variable based on such intuition.    In addition, there is a possibility that a
firm is an affiliate of another firm and exits as a part of corporate restructuring.    We
will take such cases into account by separating our data set into affiliates of other firms
and independent firms.
The explanatory factors that possibly affect the survival and exit of firms are
divided into four categories: (i) variables related to individual corporate performance,
(ii)  variables  representing  firms’  competitiveness  and  technology,  (iii)  variables
expressing internalization patterns and global commitment of firms, and (iv) industry
dummies  at  the  2-digit  level  of  the  Basic  Survey.
14    The list  of  variables  with  the
                                                   
12 Figure 1 shows the baseline survival function because it is convenient to interpret the
survival pattern of sample firms.    However, the baseline hazard function h0(t) is used
for estimating the proportional hazard model.    The relationship between h0(t) and S0(t)






13 McGuckin and Nguyen (1995), for example, found that, in the U.S. manufacturing
sector in 1977-1987, M&As were more likely to occur for establishments with higher
labor productivity, though the opposite applied for establishments with more than 250
workers.
14 Note that the 2-digit industry classification of the Basic Survey covers 23
manufacturing sectors, which is a far more detailed break-down than the 2-digit level of
usual industrial classifications.12
expected signs (except industry dummies) is summarized in Table 1 (a).
15    Table 1 (b)
and (c) present basic statistics of independent variables and the distribution of firm age
for the whole sample set.
<Table 1>
The variables related to individual corporate performance include the size and
the  capital  intensity  of  firms.    As  previous  studies  have  found,  firm  size,  here
expressed by the natural logarithm of the number of regular workers, would have a
positive  relationship  with  the  firms’  survival.
16    Capital-labor  ratio  represents  the
quality of production equipment or efficiency in production, and thus a firm with a
higher ratio would have stronger competitiveness to survive.    Operating surplus ratio,
which is operating surplus divided by total sales, is also included.    The expected signs
for the coefficient of these variables are negative.    The expected sign of the coefficient
for the value added ratio after controlling operating surplus ratio is not certain.    The
expected sign of the coefficient for the wage ratio is positive; heavy personnel payments
would be a burden for firm survival.
The variables presenting firms’ competitiveness and technological intensity
include R&D dummy and advertisement cost ratios. The former indicates whether or
not the firm has R&D expenditure, while the latter is the ratio of advertisement cost to
operating cost.
17    As Audretsch and Mahmood (1994, 1995) have emphasized, R&D
                                                   
15 Note that all variables are for each corporate firm that includes its establishments but
does not include its affiliates.
16 Jovanovic (1982) theoretically demonstrated a strong positive relationship between
firm size and firm performance, as opposed to the stochastic growth rate hypothesis
regardless of firm size along the intuition of Gibrat’s law.    Many of the previous
empirical studies on the survival of firms, including Audretsch and Mahmood (1994,
1995), Mata and Portugal (1994), and Mata, Portugal and Guimaraes (1995), also found
a positive relationship between firm size and the survival of firms.
17 Because roughly 60% of firms in the sample have no R&D expenditure, R&D dummy
(whether a firm conducts R&D or not) are applied as an explanatory variable in the
following analysis.    The ratio of R&D expenditures to sales would be used instead, but
the statistical power of such strongly censored data may be doubted.    In addition, some
important studies including Aw and Hwang (1995) emphasize that whether a firm
conducts R&D or not would be more important than the magnitude of R&D expenditure
in explaining corporate performance.    In any case, we also applied the ratio of R&D13
intensity would have a positive effect on the firms’ survival.    Advertising cost ratio is
used  as  a  proxy  variable  for  product  differentiation  in  the  literature  on  industrial
organization.    In  general,  producers  of  differentiated  goods  would  enjoy  stronger
competitiveness  than  producers  of standardized goods.    The expected  signs  for  the
coefficients of these two variables are thus negative.
The  variables  that  we  would  like  to  highlight  in  our  analysis  are  those
representing  the  internalization and  global commitment  of firms.    After  controlling
with the relatively well-established variables noted above, let us check whether or not
internalization and global commitment affect the probability of a firm’s survival.    The
outsourcing dummy, the number of establishments, and the owning affiliates dummy are
intended to capture the degree of internalization.    Outsourcing is in general a far more
foot-loose form of inter-firm relationship than the traditional long-term subcontracting
system.    The expected sign of the coefficient for the outsourcing dummy is negative
because  outsourcing  indicates  parsimony  in  specifying  internalized  activities.    The
number of establishments, and having affiliates, show the extensiveness of internalized
activities, which means that the expected signs of the coefficients are positive.
Multiple forms of global commitment are expressed as the foreign sales ratio,
the foreign procurement ratio, the foreign outsourcing dummy, and the owning foreign
affiliates  dummy.
18    The  expected  signs  are  negative,  except  for  the  foreign
procurement ratio, because global commitment is supposed to make a firm more likely
to survive.
19    In the case of the foreign procurement ratio, we are not sure about the
sign of the coefficient because although purchasing commodities and selling them in a
domestic  market  certainly  provides  a  competitive  environment,  a  recession  in  the
domestic economy might adversely affect such firms.
                                                                                                                                                        
expenditures to total sales and obtained basically the same results.
As for advertisement activities, we apply the ratio of advertisement
expenditures to sales instead of an advertisement dummy as an explanatory variable
because only 19% of firms in the sample have zero advertisement expenditure.
18 Precisely speaking, foreign sales and foreign procurement are slightly different from
exports and imports because they include sales and procurement of establishments
located abroad.    It does not make much difference, however, since the number of
establishments located abroad is limited.
19 Our expected signs are consistent with the U.S. case reviewed by Lewis and
Richardson (2001).14
The foreign ownership ratio indicates whether or not firms are affiliates of
foreign  firms and  also shows  the strength  of foreign  managerial  control.
20    Foreign
firms might make a decision on the exit of their affiliates in Japan more strictly and
more quickly than Japanese indigenous firms if the performance of their affiliates in
Japan deteriorates.    We therefore expect a positive coefficient for foreign ownership.
The affiliate firm dummy is introduced to check whether affiliate firms owned
by other firms, and independent firms, differ in their probability of survival.    If the
exiting cost is high, the exit of an affiliate would be easier than that of an independent
firm.    We thus expect a positive sign for the coefficient of the affiliate firm dummy.
Our regression equations are somewhat ad-hoc, just like the ones that have
appeared in previous empirical studies, in the sense that they are not derived from any
formal  theoretical  model.    Due  to  the  complicated  nature of  the  micro  behavior of
corporate firms, we are still not able to clearly express causal relationships among the
variables.    For example, some explanatory variables may have a causal relationship
with others, though it is usually very difficult to write down a system of simultaneous
equations or to find decent instrumental variables in the micro data set.    In this sense,
our study is a preliminary one, and is merely trying to find statistical associations of
internalization and global commitment with a firm’s probability of survival, utilizing
fairly well-established controls such as firm size, and R&D intensity.
5. Results
This section presents the results of our hazard model analysis and discusses
their implications.    Table 2 provides the results of analysis with respect to all firms
with 100 or more workers.    To try to avoid obvious multicollinearity, some explanatory
variables  are  alternately  dropped  from  regression  equations.    We  also  show  the
regression results with and without industry dummies.    The regression results are fairly
stable and mostly confirm our intuition.
                                                   
20 Note that the Basic Survey simply collects total foreign ownership ratios, and thus
“foreign ownership” includes both foreign direct investment and portfolio investment.15
<Table 2>
First,  consistent with previous  literature, firm  size and R&D  dummy have
negative coefficients, which means that larger firms and firms that conduct R&D are
more likely to survive.    The coefficients for advertisement cost ratio unexpectedly have
positive signs.    Signs of these three variables are fairly robust even when we change
the sample set in the following analysis.    Capital labor ratio, operating surplus ratio,
value added ratio, and wage ratio are sensitive to the sample set and will be discussed
later.
Second, excessive internalization is proved to be a  serious problem.    The
number of establishments has significantly positive signs while the outsourcing dummy
has a negative sign.    After being controlled by other variables, the compact design of a
corporate structure concentrating on core competences is important for enhancing the
probability of survival.
Third,  global  commitment  seems  to  be  important  for  survival  though  the
result is mixed for some variables.    The foreign sales dummy has a negative coefficient,
which is consistent with our intuition that exporting activities are positively correlated
with  the  likelihood  of  survival.    However,  the  foreign  outsourcing  dummy and  the
owning  foreign  affiliates  dummy  have  positive  coefficients  in  these  regressions,
opposite to our prior expectations.    Actually, the size of firms matters for the signs of
these coefficients; this issue is discussed in more detail below.
Fourth,  the  sign  of  the  coefficient  for  the  foreign  ownership  ratio  is  not
significantly different from zero.    This means that the widely-held belief that foreign
companies behave in a foot-loose way is not supported statistically.
Fifth,  the  affiliate  firm  dummy  has  a  strongly  positive  coefficient,  which
means that affiliates of other firms are more likely to exit than independent firms.    As
shown in Appendix Table A1, the “exit ratio” of affiliates firms is 6.4% while that of
independent firms is 5.6%.
21    Even after controlling other factors, the probability of
exiting is different.
                                                   
21 As regards the definition of “exit ratio,” please refer to the Appendix.16
Related to the last point, we separate our sample set into two, affiliate firms
and independent firms, and again conduct regressions.    The results are shown in Tables
3 and 4.    Most notable is that the signs of the coefficients for the operating surplus
ratio, the value added ratio, and the wage ratio are negative, negative, and positive,
respectively, for affiliate firms; while the signs are insignificant for independent firms.
This means that whether  or not an  affiliate is  closed down  strongly depends on  its
performance,  while  a  similar  mechanism  of  natural  selection  does  not  work  for
independent firms.    The exit of affiliates can be part of corporate restructuring, and in
such cases the cost of exiting may be lower than usual exits, if the possible relocation of
released resources is taken into account.    In other words, the cost of exiting is high for
the independent firm, so that it cannot get out of the market even if its performance is
poor. Or, an alternative interpretation is that independent firms exit regardless of their




Tables 5 and 6 present regression results when we separate our sample into
firms with affiliates and firms without.    As shown in Appendix Table A1, the “exit
ratio” of firms with affiliates (4.6%) is much lower than that of firms without (7.6%).




Because  the  question  of  over-internalization  seems  to  strongly  influence
survival and exit, we separated our sample into different employment size categories
and  then  conducted  regressions.    As  shown  in  Table  7,  very  clear-cut  results  are
obtained for global commitment variables.    The foreign sales dummy has a significant17
negative  coefficient  when  firms  are  small,  but  the  significance  diminishes  as  firms
become larger.    On the other hand, the owning foreign affiliates dummy switches the
sign of its coefficient from positive to negative as the firm size goes up.    Exporting
activities seem to be a proper form of global commitment for small firms, while having
foreign affiliates costs them too much.    Large firms can afford to hold foreign affiliates
in order to take advantage of global commitment.    The foreign outsourcing dummy
also changes its sign from positive to negative (though not significantly different from
zero) as the firm size increases.    The foreign procurement dummy has a significantly
positive coefficient when firms are small but loses its significance as firm size increases.
We can thus conclude that global commitment improves the probability of survival if
the channel is properly chosen with particular consideration to the size of the firm.
<Table 7>
6. Conclusion
This  paper  conducts  a  survival  analysis  of  Japanese  corporate  firms  using
census  data  collected  by  METI  in  the  mid-1990s.    Analyses,  based  on  a  study  of
exiting firms, confirm  our intuition as regards the three generalizations listed in the
introduction.    Our findings can be summarized as follows.
First, excessive internalization in corporate structure and related activities seem
to  be  harmful  for  corporate  survival.    This  finding  may  depend  on  the  historical
background  and on  the  market conditions  that Japanese firms were confronted with
during the mid-1990s.    In the 1980s, the Japanese economic system was praised, and
one  of  the  components  thought  to  be  essential  to  the  system  was  the  extensive
internalization of various activities within corporate firms as well as the construction of
concerted  long-term  inter-firm  relationships.    In  the  1990s,  however,  extensive
internalization  became  an  obstacle  to  staying  alive  rather  than  an  advantage  in  a
stagnant economic environment.    In addition, we should point out that international18
competition became far more intense in the 1990s, even in sectors such as electronic
machinery in which Japanese firms previously enjoyed competitive strength.    Having
too many  establishments  and  too many  affiliates  is  no  good  for  corporate survival.
Concentration on core competences by using outsourcing contracts seems to enhance
the probability of survival.    The challenge that confronts Japanese firms is whether or
not  they  can  achieve  efficient  reorganization  of  corporate  structure  and  inter-firm
relationships.
Second,  global  commitment  seems  to  help  Japanese  firms  to  be  more
competitive  and  more  likely  to  survive.    However, the  channels  or  types of  global
commitment must be carefully chosen according to the size of the firm.    Small firms
can benefit from exporting activities, but having foreign affiliates or conducting foreign
outsourcing may aggravate rather than assist performance.    Large firms, on the other
hand, can utilize the channels of foreign direct investment and foreign outsourcing and
enhance the probability of their survival.    Kimura and Kiyota (2003) found that global
commitment  accelerates  corporate  restructuring;  but  we  add  the  caveat  that  an
appropriate degree of internalization must be established, even in the context of global
commitment.
Third, we find that corporate performance matters in the choice of exits for
affiliate firms, but it does not matter in the survival/exit of independent firms.    Taking
into account the fact that M&As are not a common form of exit in Japan, we question
the possible malfunctioning of market mechanisms in exits of independent firms.    One
possibility is that the cost of exiting is too high for independent firms, so they stay in the
market for a lengthy period even when their performance is poor.    Or, the selection of
survival  or exit  is  done  regardless  of  each firm’s  performance  because  of  financial
constraints and incomplete information.    Considering the low level of turnover ratios
in Japan, there is a strong need for an economic environment conducive to easier and
more efficient corporate turnovers.
Fourth, we do not find any statistically significant evidence that firms partially
or wholly owned by foreigners are more likely to exit.    There is an on-going debate on
whether  or  not  accepting  inward  foreign  direct  investment  is  beneficial.    Some
observers have expressed concern about the foot-loose behavior of foreign companies.19
However,  after  controlling  other  factors,  our  regression  results  indicate  that  little
evidence exists for such a tendency.
The  analysis  conducted  in  this  paper  utilizes  only  a  small  part  of  the
information carried by the micro-data, but has already very effectively investigated at
the  micro  level  what  happened during the  long-lasting recession  in Japan.    Further
empirical studies using micro data sets should be encouraged.20
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Appendix: “Exit” of a firm
As discussed in section 2, the Basic Survey does not include a reconfirmation
process to check whether or not a firm genuinely exits from the market.    To avoid
erroneous interpretation as far as possible, our study treats the “exit” of a firm as the
omission of a firm from the survey in two sequent years.
Table A1 counts the number of observations and exit firms in our data set for
regressions.    If a firm survives, say, throughout the sample period of 1994 F/Y-1997
F/Y, it is counted as four observations.    Hence, “exit ratio” shown in this table is much
higher than the proportion of exit firms in one year.
<Table A1>
Table A2 presents the  number of firms that dropped from the  sample and
“returned” later.    These tables show that a considerable number of firms did return to
the sample; about 30% of firms that disappeared from the sample returned the next
year.
22    For example, among 1,552 firms that disappeared in the 1995 F/Y survey, 448
firms  re-appeared  in  1996  F/Y.    This  suggests  that  to  treat  a  two-year  sequent
disappearance from the sample as a criterion of exit substantially reduces a possibly
erroneous determination of “exit.”
23    In addition, if a firm returned to the sample in a
period of over two years, we treated the firm as “no exit.”
<Table A2>
It is obvious that the “return” of firms is mostly due to ineffective responses to
the  questionnaire.    The  cut-off  line  in  size  applied  by  the  Basic  Survey  would  be
                                                   
22 Notice that such a problem is not even detected in empirical studies using census data
in other countries because census data are not typically available every year.    Our data
analysis suggests that results with other statistics must also be carefully interpreted,
even though a similar problem is explicitly presented.
23 Applying a more-than-two-year sequent disappearance from the sample as a criterion23
another factor responsible for the “return” of firms, but we believe that the problem is
not  very  serious.    Table  A3  shows  descriptive  statistics  of  annual  changes  in  the
number of workers for the full sample, and Table A4 does the same, but for firms with
less than 300 workers.    Both tables are of course for firms that exist in the sample in
two sequent years, so we must be careful lest these figures are somewhat understated by
not including firms dropped from the sample.    In the case of the full sample, the mean
is around 30, and the standard deviation is about 150 while the median is 7 to 8.    When
looking at the sample for small and medium sized firms, the mean is 10 to 11, the
median is 5, and the standard deviation is about 25.    These imply that while some large
firms alter the number of workers by a larger amount, smaller firms do not significantly
change the number of workers.    We can thus guess that the cut-off line in size does not
greatly distort our study.
<Table A3>
<Table A4>
For reasons of caution, though, we have dropped firms with less than 100
workers from the sample when conducting the regressions reported in Tables 2 to 7.    It
is  not very likely that a  firm  with 100  workers  in one year  reduces the  number of
workers to less than 50 in the next year.    That is because the mean and median changes
in employment for firms with less than 300 workers (survived firms only) are only 10-
11 and 5.    The standard deviation of 25 means that a change in the number of workers
by more than 50 corresponds to a change by more than two sigmas if the standard
deviation is assumed.    Therefore, by dropping firms with less than 100 workers, we do
not worry too much about the cut-off line issue in the sample.
                                                                                                                                                        
of exit would be a choice if we had longer time series data set.24
Table 1: Expected signs and basic statistics
(a) The list of independent variables with expected signs of coefficients
Independent variables Definition Expected sign
Firm size Number of total regular workers (natural logarithm) -
Capital labor ratio Tangible fixed assets / total regular workers -
Operating surplus ratio Operating surplus / total sales -
Value added ratio (Total sales-total procurement) / total sales ?
Wage ratio Total wage / operating cost +
R&D dummy 1 for firms with R&D expenditure; 0 for firms without -
Advertisement cost ratio Advertisement cost / operating cost -
Foreign sales dummy 1 for firms with foreign sales; 0 for firms without -
Foreign procurement dummy 1 for firms with foreign procurement; 0 for firms without ?
Outsourcing dummy 1 for firms with outsourcing; 0 for firms without -
Foreign outsourcing dummy 1 for firms with outsourcing to firms abroad; 0 for firms without -
Foreign ownership ratio Foreign ownership ratio +
Number of establishments Number of establishments owned by each firm +
Affiliate firm dummy 1 for firms that are affiliates of other firms; 0 for independent firms +
Owning affiliates dummy 1 for firms with affiliate(s); 0 for firms without +
Owning foreign affiliates dummy 1 for firms with foreign affiliate(s); 0 for firms without -
(b) Basic statistics of independent variables
Mean s.d. Minimum Maximum
Firm size 402 1079 50 53584
Firm size (in natural logarithm) 5.280 0.996 3.912 10.889
Capital labor ratio 9.634 15.661 0.000 962.275
Operating surplus ratio 0.020 0.450 -89.032 0.860
Value added ratio 0.431 0.346 -30.427 1.000
Wage ratio 0.169 0.107 0.001 1.000
R&D dummy 0.393 0.488 0.000 1.000
Advertisement cost ratio 0.006 0.018 0.000 0.626
Foreign sales ratio 0.256 0.436 0.000 1.000
Foreign procurement ratio 0.242 0.428 0.000 1.000
Outsourcing dummy 0.506 0.500 0.000 1.000
Foreign outsourcing dummy 0.030 0.170 0.000 1.000
Foreign ownership ratio 0.013 0.095 0.000 1.000
Number of establishments 9.109 27.544 0.000 997
Affiliate firm dummy 0.345 0.475 0.000 1.000
Owning affiliates dummy 0.565 0.496 0.000 1.000
Owing foreign affiliates dummy 0.175 0.380 0.000 1.000
Data source: The MITI database.
Note: the following observations are dropped from the sample;
(1) firms with more than 100 affiliates
(2) firms with more than 1000 establishments
(3) firms with outsourcing cost larger than operating cost
(4) firms with R&D expenditure larger than operating cost
(5) firms with advertisement cost larger than operating cost
(6) firms with total wage larger than operating cost25
(c)ɹDistribution of firm age (1994 F/Y survey)












55 and more 171
total 16749






































Table 2:  Results of Cox regressions: firms with 100 or more workers
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Independent variables
Firm size -0.340*** -0.376*** -0.375*** -0.410***
0.035 0.035 0.036 0.036
Capital labor ratio -0.002 -0.002 -0.00003 -0.0002
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Operating surplus ratio 0.011 0.031 0.006 0.012
0.035 0.034 0.036 0.036
Value added ratio -0.102 -0.205* -0.092 0.121
0.126 0.124 0.133 0.133
Wage ratio 1.145*** 1.112*** 0.661** 0.748***
0.261 0.259 0.278 0.277
R&D dummy -0.215*** -0.282*** -0.138** -0.171***
0.056 0.054 0.060 0.059
Advertisement cost ratio 2.859*** 3.322*** 2.795** 2.864***
1.035 0.981 1.108 1.102
Foreign sales dummy -0.217*** -0.310*** -0.192*** -0.263***
0.071 0.074 0.074 0.078
Foreign procurement dummy 0.260*** 0.180** 0.252*** 0.174**
0.069 0.071 0.070 0.072
Outsourcing dummy -0.225*** -0.145**
0.052 0.060
Foreign outsourcing dummy 0.345** 0.293**
0.136 0.138
Foreign ownership ratio -0.005 0.105 0.137 0.220
0.227 0.227 0.228 0.228
Number of establishments 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002***
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Affiliate firm dummy 0.961*** 0.977*** 0.937*** 0.956***
0.050 0.049 0.050 0.050
Owning affiliates dummy -0.075 -0.072
0.052 0.053
Owning foreign affiliates dummy 0.216*** 0.218***
0.078 0.079
Industry dummies NO NO YES YES
Log-likelihood -16374.94 -16378.45 -16281.23 -16279.08
Chi-squared 643.27*** 636.25*** 830.69*** 834.99***
N 48209 48209 48209 48209
Note:     Standard errors are presented below the estimates of coefficients.
             ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.27
Table 3: Results of Cox regressions: affiliate firms with 100 or more workers
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Independent variables
Firm size -0.187*** -0.241*** -0.196*** -0.261***
0.055 0.055 0.058 0.057
Capital labor ratio 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Operating surplus ratio -0.357*** -0.345*** -0.393*** -0.401***
0.123 0.123 0.129 0.130
Value added ratio -0.602*** -0.660*** -0.557*** -0.557***
0.195 0.193 0.210 0.210
Wage ratio 1.820*** 1.899*** 1.469*** 1.688***
0.354 0.348 0.388 0.383
R&D dummy -0.131 -0.237*** -0.003 -0.062
0.090 0.087 0.099 0.098
Advertisement cost ratio 5.134*** 5.686*** 4.666*** 4.884***
1.603 1.529 1.700 1.693
Foreign sales dummy -0.188 -0.226* -0.190 -0.212
0.125 0.129 0.128 0.132
Foreign procurement dummy 0.332*** 0.309*** 0.323*** 0.295**
0.119 0.121 0.121 0.124
Outsourcing dummy -0.324*** -0.166*
0.083 0.098
Foreign outsourcing dummy 0.131 0.158
0.255 0.258
Foreign ownership ratio -0.026 0.081 0.049 0.151
0.245 0.247 0.248 0.250
Number of establishments 0.002 0.002* 0.001 0.001
0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002
Owning affiliates dummy -0.428*** -0.464***
0.084 0.087
Owning foreign affiliates dummy -0.227 -0.191
0.161 0.163
Industry dummies NO NO YES YES
Log-likelihood -5749.25 -5769.31 -5717.94 -5733.85
Chi-squared 134.33*** 94.21*** 196.95*** 165.14***
N 16700 16700 16700 16700
Note:     Standard errors are presented below the estimates of coefficients.
             ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.28
Table 4: Results of Cox regressions: independent firms (not affiliate firms) with 100 or more workers
Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
Independent variables
Firm size -0.438*** -0.460*** -0.471*** -0.491***
0.046 0.047 0.048 0.048
Capital labor ratio -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Operating surplus ratio -0.031 -0.012 -0.030 -0.025
0.054 0.053 0.054 0.054
Value added ratio 0.221 0.110 0.176 0.143
0.164 0.161 0.174 0.173
Wage ratio 0.495 0.338 -0.012 -0.057
0.374 0.373 0.398 0.397
R&D dummy -0.253*** -0.286*** -0.209*** -0.215***
0.071 0.070 0.076 0.075
Advertisement cost ratio 1.540 2.033 1.806 1.861
1.447 1.378 1.533 1.517
Foreign sales dummy -0.216** -0.343*** -0.202** -0.314***
0.087 0.091 0.092 0.096
Foreign procurement dummy 0.213** 0.103 0.203** 0.099
0.084 0.089 0.086 0.090
Outsourcing dummy -0.171** -0.133*
0.068 0.076
Foreign outsourcing dummy 0.420*** 0.356**
0.162 0.164
Foreign ownership ratio -1.349 -1.440* -1.230 -1.333
0.853 0.867 0.850 0.864
Number of establishments 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002***
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Owning affiliates dummy 0.185*** 0.208***
0.069 0.070
Owning foreign affiliates dummy 0.406*** 0.413***
0.092 0.092
Industry dummies NO NO YES YES
Log-likelihood -9454.27 -9447.18 -9376.87 -9369.89
Chi-squared 197.98*** 212.16*** 352.78*** 366.75***
N 31509 31509 31509 31509
Note:     Standard errors are presented below the estimates of coefficients.
             ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.29
Table 5: Results of Cox regressions:  parent firms with affiliate(s) with 100 or more workers
Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16
Independent variables
Firm size -0.446*** -0.474*** -0.468*** -0.492***
0.044 0.045 0.045 0.046
Capital labor ratio -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Operating surplus ratio -0.012 0.007 0.003 0.011
0.060 0.060 0.060 0.061
Value added ratio 0.123 0.022 0.018 -0.026
0.172 0.171 0.181 0.181
Wage ratio 1.084*** 0.940** 0.483 0.476
0.408 0.409 0.442 0.443
R&D dummy -0.170** -0.219*** -0.166** -0.193**
0.073 0.072 0.079 0.079
Advertisement cost ratio 0.962 1.611 1.466 1.532
1.843 1.796 1.922 1.912
Foreign sales dummy -0.062 -0.164* -0.054 -0.136
0.086 0.091 0.092 0.096
Foreign procurement dummy 0.177** 0.082 0.181** 0.091
0.084 0.088 0.086 0.090
Outsourcing dummy -0.188*** -0.199***
0.071 0.079
Foreign outsourcing dummy 0.396** 0.302*
0.156 0.158
Foreign ownership ratio -0.486 -0.432 -0.396 -0.351
0.437 0.440 0.436 0.439
Number of establishments 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002***
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Affiliate firm dummy 0.703*** 0.714*** 0.683*** 0.693***
0.074 0.074 0.075 0.075
Owning foreign affiliates dummy 0.236*** 0.234***
0.087 0.088
Industry dummies NO NO YES YES
Log-likelihood -8244.26 -8240.52 -8186.51 -8184.03
Chi-squared 255.74*** 263.21*** 371.24*** 376.20***
N 30676 30676 30676 30676
Note:     Standard errors are presented below the estimates of coefficients.
             ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.30
Table 6: Results of Cox regressions:  firms without affiliates with 100 or more workers
Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20
Independent variables
Firm size -0.170*** -0.169*** -0.201*** -0.202***
0.061 0.061 0.063 0.063
Capital labor ratio -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001
0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002
Operating surplus ratio -0.366*** -0.347*** -0.365*** -0.365***
0.117 0.117 0.121 0.121
Value added ratio -0.406** -0.514*** -0.291 -0.296
0.184 0.180 0.199 0.198
Wage ratio 1.308*** 1.214*** 0.915** 0.931***
0.336 0.335 0.361 0.361
R&D dummy -0.285*** -0.345*** -0.154 -0.159*
0.089 0.087 0.095 0.094
Advertisement cost ratio 3.927*** 4.149*** 4.021*** 4.015***
1.228 1.157 1.433 1.431
Foreign sales dummy -0.507*** -0.536*** -0.474*** -0.478***
0.136 0.135 0.139 0.139
Foreign procurement dummy 0.364*** 0.347*** 0.337*** 0.317***
0.118 0.120 0.119 0.121
Outsourcing dummy -0.269*** -0.049
0.078 0.094
Foreign outsourcing dummy 0.193 0.252
0.289 0.291
Foreign ownership ratio 0.171 0.237 0.244 0.261
0.273 0.273 0.279 0.279
Number of establishments 0.003** 0.003*** 0.002* 0.002*
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Affiliate firm dummy 1.177*** 1.162*** 1.166*** 1.165***
0.072 0.072 0.073 0.073
Industry dummies NO NO YES YES
Log-likelihood -6898.98 -6904.84 -6852.46 -6852.24
Chi-squared 375.19*** 363.47*** 468.23*** 468.66***
N 17533 17533 17533 17533
Note:     Standard errors are presented below the estimates of coefficients.
             ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.31
Table 7  Results of Cox regressions: by firm size (number of regular workers)
Model 21 Model 22 Model 23 Model 24 Model 25
(Firm size:100-199) (Firm size:200-299) (Firm size:300-499) (Firm size:500-999) (Firm size:1000 or more)
Independent variables
Firm size -0.553*** -0.253 0.286 0.528 -0.503**
0.169 0.481 0.415 0.388 0.213
Capital labor ratio 0.001 0.003 -0.021** -0.040*** -0.001
0.002 0.002 0.009 0.014 0.008
Operating surplus ratio -0.153 0.051 0.584 -0.109 -0.964
0.121 0.089 1.436 0.175 2.257
Value added ratio -0.263 -0.221 0.613 -0.041 0.298
0.173 0.321 0.374 0.447 0.564
Wage ratio 0.489 1.405** -0.294 1.789** 1.559
0.380 0.649 0.832 0.816 1.153
R&D dummy -0.169** -0.332** -0.338** -0.362* 0.155
0.083 0.136 0.160 0.203 0.278
Advertisement cost ratio 3.541*** 3.877 4.623* -14.919** 3.463
1.371 2.953 2.507 7.507 4.968
Foreign sales dummy -0.299*** -0.364** -0.215 -0.164 0.058
0.109 0.181 0.198 0.259 0.317
Foreign procurement dummy 0.191* 0.249 0.228 -0.169 0.142
0.104 0.169 0.181 0.239 0.273
Foreign outsourcing dummy 0.236 0.449 0.582* 0.522 -0.208
0.218 0.326 0.303 0.382 0.535
Foreign ownership ratio 0.321 0.337 0.391 0.895 -0.870
0.363 0.568 0.492 0.689 0.721
Number of establishments 0.005 0.0002 0.009** 0.004* 0.002**
0.006 0.007 0.004 0.002 0.001
Affiliate firm dummy 0.919*** 0.909*** 1.083*** 1.226*** 1.021***
0.070 0.119 0.129 0.166 0.223
Owning foreign affiliates dummy 0.576*** 0.044 0.218 -0.035 -0.657**
0.117 0.186 0.181 0.237 0.268
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Log-likelihood -7717.71 -2399.95 -1879.50 -1140.37 -667.44
Chi-squared 332.26*** 133.01*** 145.46*** 157.88*** 94.55***
N 20241 8871 7789 6250 5058
Note:     Standard errors are presented below the estimates of coefficients.
             ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.32
Figure 1: Survival probability and the age of firm
Note: survival probability (S0(t): baseline survival function) is obtained as follows:






So(t)= exp -H0(t) { }
† 
hi(t) =h0(t)exp(bxi) .
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Appendix Table A1: Number of exit firms
Total observations Exit firms Exit ratio (%)
Independent firms 44514 2485 5.58
Afffiliate firms 23456 1511 6.44
Total 67970 3996 5.88
Firms with affiliates 38424 1764 4.59
Firms without affiliates 29546 2232 7.55
Total 67970 3996 5.88
Firm size: 50-99 19761 2175 11.01
Firm size: 100-149 12345 624 5.05
Firm size: 150-199 7896 319 4.04
Firm size: 200-249 5133 183 3.57
Firm size: 250-299 3738 147 3.93
Firm size: 300 or more 19097 548 2.87
Total 67970 3996 5.88
Notes:
(1) "Exit firms" are defined in our analysis as those which dropped from the surverys in
two sequent years or more and also never returned to the survey once they dropped from
the sample.
(2) The figures for total observations show the number of firm samples showed up in
our panel dataset. Those that showed up in the sequent surveys from 1994 to 1997, for
instance, are counted as 4 observations. On the other hand, the figures for "exit firms"
show the number of exit firms as defined above. Thus, "exit ratio" is obtained by
dividing the number of "exit firm" by the number of total sample firms.34
Dropped in 1995 Dropped in 1996
Dropped Firm Total 1552 1070
Returned in 1996 448
Returned in 1997 115 324
Returned firm total 563 324
Returned firm % 36.3 30.3
Note: Samples with missing data are included.
Appendix Table A3:  Changes in firm size for the full sample (surviving firms only)
(Number of regular workers, absolute value)
1994-1995 1995-1996 1996-1997
Mean 31.6 30.7 29.1
Median 8 7 7
s.d. 145.5 157.3 131.8
Appendix Table A4:  Changes in firm size for firms with less than 300 workers
(surviving firms only)
(Number of regular workers, absolute value)
1994-1995 1995-1996 1996-1997
Mean 11.2 10.4 10.7
Median 5 5 5
s.d. 26.6 24.7 26.5
Appendix Table A2:  Number of "returned" firms: firms that  appeared in the 1994
F/Y Survey